Berit Brogaard (University of Miami) (Ph.D., SUNY, Buffalo), Professor and Director of the Brogaard Lab for Multisensory Research. Her areas of research include perception, consciousness, emotions, philosophical psychology, semantics and philosophical logic. Brit has written over 100 peer-reviewed articles in journals such as Journal of Philosophy, Noûs,Philosophers’ Imprint, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Analysis. She is the author of three books: Transient Truths (Oxford University Press, 2012), On Romantic Love (Oxford University Press, 2015). and Superhuman Mind(Penquin, 2015).
Paul Faulkner (University of Sheffield) (BA Cambridge, MA KCL, PhD UCL) The focus of my research is the epistemology of testimony. The ambition is to produce a theory of testimony that recognises and accounts for the ways in which testimony is a unique source of knowledge and justification. In doing so I am interested in questions such as the following. Are others´ utterances good grounds for belief merely because they can constitute good evidence? What is the psychologically correct description of how we respond to testimony? Are the reactive attitudes we demonstrate in communication epistemologically important? In what ways does believing what someone says introduce problems of trust? Is there anything wrong with lying? Do knowledge and belief differ in the way they get transmitted across persons? How does believing what a speaker says relate an audience to that speaker and to a wider community of knowledge? In what ways, do we need to invoke communities in order to explain the ways in which knowledge is social? Recently, my interest has focused on trust.
Sanford Goldberg (Northwestern University) (PhD Columbia University, 1995) works in the areas of Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind. Goldberg’s interests in Epistemology include such topics as reliabilism, the epistemology of testimony, the theory of epistemic justification, social epistemology, self-knowledge, and skepticism. In the Philosophy of Mind and Language, his interests center on the individuation of the propositional attitudes, externalist theories of mental content and linguistic meaning, the semantics of speech and attitude reports, and speech act theory. A good sample of his work can be found in his four recent books, Anti-Individualism (Cambridge University Press, 2007), Relying on Others (Oxford University Press, 2010), Assertion(Oxford University Press, 2015), and To the Best of Our Knowledge (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
Katherine Hawley (University of St Andrews) (Ph.D., University of Cambridge) She´s working on a project concerning the ethics and epistemology of trust, promising, and competence. She said something about that project here. During 2014-16 she was supported by a Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship, and during 2016-17 by funding from the Philosophy and Science of Self-Control project at Florida State University. Member of the board of the St Andrews Centre for Exoplanet Science.
Jonathan Matheson (University of North Florida) (Ph.D. Philosophy, University of Rochester) Assistant professor at UNF. A Critical Introduction to Justification. Co-Authored with Trent Dougherty, Kevin McCain, and Jason Rodgers. Under contract with Bloomsbury Academic. The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. Under contract with Palgrave. The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. Co-Edited with Rico Vitz. Under Contract with Oxford University Press.